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THE INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFTS ACT AND NATIVE 
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One ought not to hoard culture. It should be adapted and infused into 
society as a leaven. 
-WALLACE STEVENS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Congress enacted the Indian Arts and Crafts Act and the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act with the goal of 
providing tribes with greater control and authority over their own handicraft 
traditions and cultural resources.  Although both laws have been successful 
in many aspects, both have also produced unintended consequences that 
have disadvantaged less powerful tribal groups and individual Native 
American artisans.  This Article explores those consequences, particularly 
in respect to situations where the Acts enable economically and politically 
powerful tribal groups to exert control over what constitutes legitimate 
Native American culture and what does not.  This Article concludes with 
suggestions as to how Congress may make simple amendments to both laws 
that would address the identified issues and allow for more equitable 
control over authentic Native American culture by all tribal groups, rather 
than only those currently empowered under the Acts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a remarkable feat that North America’s indigenous peoples retain 
much of their original culture.  Four hundred years of assimilationist 
pressure and explicit policy would have overcome a people less fiercely 
protective of their own cultural traditions.  Across the United States today, 
federally recognized and unrecognized tribes continue to perform rituals, 
pass down oral traditions, and practice arts in the same manner as their 
ancestors before them.  However, native cultural traditions are still at risk—
both internally and externally. 
Between the mid-1970s and early 1990s, Congress enacted a number of 
laws aimed at protecting and encouraging tribal culture and economies.1  
 
1.  See Jeff R. Keohane, The Rise of Tribal Self-Determination and Economic Development, 
33 HUMAN RIGHTS 9–12 (2006), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_ 
magazine_home/human_rights_vol33_2006/spring2006/hr_spring06_keohane.html (providing 
overview of federal legislation during this period and the rapid growth of tribal autonomy and 
economic benefits). 
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Among such laws were the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,2 the Indian Arts 
and Crafts Act (“IACA”),3 and the Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”).4 
Since enactment, both IACA and NAGPRA have caused considerable 
controversy both inside and outside of Indian country.5  Congress enacted 
IACA to prevent non-Indian artisans from presenting their work as 
authentic Indian work and thereby deceiving consumers.6  NAGPRA, 
through its interplay with the Archaeological Resources Protection Act 
(“ARPA”),7 ensures that federally funded museums return tribal ceremonial 
objects and human remains back to the tribes and gives tribes primary rights 
over all native burial sites located on federal and Indian lands.8  Though 
both IACA and NAGPRA have the intended effect of giving tribes 
enforceable rights with which to protect native culture, both statutes also 
have the unintended consequence of consolidating tribal cultural 
authority—much to the detriment of unaffiliated Indians and other less 
powerful tribal groups.9  This Article argues that the operation of IACA and 
NAGPRA has created tribal “cultural hegemonies”10 in which tribes can 
diminish minority voices in tribal culture and hinder legitimate 
anthropological and archeological research.  Part I of this Article provides 
 
2.  25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316). 
3.  25 U.S.C. § 305 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316). 
4.  25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316). 
5.  See generally Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004) (concerning the 
controversy around the ownership remains of the “Kennewick Man”); see also James J. 
Kilpatrick, A Cozy Little Restraint of Trade Rules Indian Arts and Crafts, SUN SENTINEL (Dec. 
13, 1992), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1992-12-13/news/9203060467_1_indian-tribe-indian-
arts-indian-blood (describing the adverse economic effects of IACA on Indian artisans not 
affiliated with a recognized tribe). 
6.  Jennie D. Woltz, The Economics of Cultural Misrepresentation: How Should the Indian 
Arts & Crafts Act of 1990 be Marketed?, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 442, 
446 (2007). 
7.  16 U.S.C. § 470(aa)-(mm) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316). 
8.  25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316) (requiring federal 
museums and agencies to “expeditiously return” human remains and funerary objects to tribes); 25 
U.S.C. § 3002(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316) (establishing order of control over 
Native American remains and funerary objects discovered on federal or Indian lands). 
9.   Matthew H. Birkhold, Note, Tipping NAGPRA’s Balancing Act: The Inequitable 
Disposition of “Culturally Unidentified” Human Remains Under NAGPRA’s New Provision, 37 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2046, 2056 (2011) (recognizing lack of standing under NAGPRA for 
federally unrecognized tribes and Indian groups); Rob Roy Smith, The Indian Arts and Crafts Act: 
What Your Clients Need to Know, 19 WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N INDIAN L. NEWSLETTER 1, 5 
(2011–2012), http://www.wsba.org/Legal-Community/Sections/Indian-Law-Section/~/media/ 
Files/Legal%20Community/Sections/Indian%20Law/Indian%20Newsletters/Winter%2020112012
%20Vol%2019%20No%202.ashx (observing that the political definition of “Indian” that IACA 
uses disadvantages unenrolled Indians and unrecognized tribal entities). 
10.  This Article uses the term “cultural hegemony” as a term of “best fit” rather than the 
term’s traditional use within Marxist social theory. 
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an overview of the statutory and regulatory schemes of IACA and 
NAGPRA.  Part II outlines some of the controversies and recurring issues 
that have arisen under the statutes.  Part III provides a number of 
suggestions as to how IACA and NAGPRA could be employed to more 
effectively safeguard tribal culture for all American Indians rather than for 
dominant tribal groups. 
II.    STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
Both IACA and NAGPRA are broad, multifaceted statutes that address 
numerous issues.  As such, the following section details only those 
provisions of IACA and NAGPRA that are necessary for an overall 
understanding of both statutes’ operative mechanisms as well as those 
provisions directly relevant to the concerns of this Article.  Similarly, 
discussion of ARPA is limited to those areas in which the statute interacts 
with the substantive provisions of NAGPRA. 
A. THE INDIAN ARTS AND CRAFTS ACT 
At its heart, IACA is essentially “a truth-in-marketing” consumer 
protection law that protects Indian manufacturers and consumers alike from 
knock-off products that companies present as being of genuine Indian 
make.11  In the years prior to IACA’s enactment, the American consumer 
market experienced increased demand for traditional Indian-made goods.12  
As a result, many non-Indian retailers and overseas manufacturers began 
producing and selling generic Indian handicrafts, with resulting economic 
losses to genuine Indian craft artisans and a cheapening of the cultural 
integrity of traditional native handicraft traditions.13  To protect genuine 
tribal artisans, IACA imposes both civil and criminal liability on individual 
and organizational violators.14  The criminal penalties of IACA are 
strikingly severe.  Individual violators can be subject to fines amounting to 
$250,000 and up to five years imprisonment.15  Corporate manufacturers 
 
11.  25 C.F.R. § 309.7 (2017); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, § 
20.02[5] (Nell Jessup Newton et al., eds., 2005 ed.) (describing IACA as a consumer and 
manufacturer protection law). 
12.  Woltz, supra note 6, at 445. 
13.  H.R. 2006, 101st Cong., pt. 2 (1990) (describing the adverse effect of imitation Indian 
goods on tribal economies, including the loss of millions of dollars of tribal revenue); see also 
Woltz, supra note 6, at 446 (describing the adverse cultural effects on tribes when manufacturers 
misuse tribal symbols on counterfeit goods). 
14.  25 U.S.C. § 305e (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316); 18 U.S.C. § 1159 (Westlaw 
through Pub. L. No. 114-316). 
15.  18 U.S.C. § 1159. 
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and retailers may be subject to fines of $1,000,000.16  Subsequent violations 
carry the risk of increased fines and terms of imprisonment.17  Furthermore, 
courts have interpreted IACA to be a strict liability statute, offering 
defendants little room to maneuver around its penalties.18  Tribes and 
individual Indian artisans can also obtain injunctive relief against violators 
under the statute’s civil provisions.19 
Though the primary purpose of IACA is to protect traditional Indian 
artisans, the statute also has the effect of essentially establishing Indian 
tribes as gatekeepers of the Indian handicrafts market.  Under IACA, an 
“Indian” for the purposes of the statute is a person who is “a member of an 
Indian tribe” or a person that an Indian tribe certifies as “an Indian 
artisan.”20  Somewhat atypically for a federal statute, IACA’s definition of 
“Indian tribe” includes not only federally recognized tribes and Alaska 
native village corporations, but those tribes that have only obtained state-
level recognition.21  Thus, the statute, at first glance, provides a seemingly 
liberal definition of which artisans are and are not “Indians” for the 
purposes of IACA.  However, IACA has the effect of giving tribes the 
enormous power of deciding who can and cannot enter the Indian 
handicrafts marketplace.22  Though this statutorily-conferred power seems 
to resemble at first the inherent sovereign power of tribes to determine 
membership criteria, it is in practice a notably different creature and has 
proved the source of controversy that has sprung up around IACA.  The 
effect of this power and its consequences will be discussed in greater length 
below. 
B. THE NATIVE AMERICAN GRAVES PROTECTION AND REPATRIATION 
ACT AND THE ARCHAEOLOGICALRESOURCES PROTECTION ACT 
Under the traditional English common law, there is no property interest 
that vests in a dead human body, although American courts have been 
willing to recognize a “quasi-right” in corpses for family members who 
 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Native American Arts, Inc. v. Village Orientals, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 876, 882 (N.D. Ill. 
1998) (“[T]he court construes [IACA] to impose strict liability for each commercial transaction 
involving a ‘false suggestion’ that merchandise was manufactured by Indians.”). 
19.  25 U.S.C. § 305e (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316); see also Native American 
Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1044 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (recognizing the right of 
Indian organizations and individuals to pursue civil actions under IACA, though finding no 
standing under the facts of that particular case). 
20.  25 U.S.C. § 305e(a)(1). 
21.  25 U.S.C. § 305e(a)(3); see also 25 C.F.R. § 309.2(e) (2017). 
22.  25 C.F.R. § 309.25(a) (2017). 
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must obtain a body for funeral purposes.23  Following several highly 
publicized incidences of grave-looting and desecration, and subsequent 
outrage from tribal communities, Congress sought to develop a solution 
concerning the control of native human remains.24  In response, Congress 
enacted NAGPRA to give tribes greater regulatory control over native 
burial sites and human remains.25  The coverage of NAGPRA is 
extraordinarily broad.  To some extent, the operation of NAGPRA causes 
the international drama over Greece’s Elgin Marbles to play out daily on the 
domestic stage.26  As its primary operative mechanism, NAGPRA 
establishes an affirmative duty for all federally funded museums and 
research institutions to catalogue and return native funerary objects and 
human remains to their affiliated tribes.27  Notably, this so-called 
“repatriation” provision applies to all relics, regardless of when a museum 
initially acquired them.28  Thus, NAGPRA provides tribes with 
considerable authority to reclaim traditional objects, even from public 
educational institutions.  Second, NAGPRA imposes criminal liability on 
any individual for trafficking in Native American human remains and 
cultural objects.29  Accordingly, NAGPRA provides a strong incentive 
against the long history of grave-robbing that has caused considerable 
anguish in Indian communities.  Finally, and most importantly for the 
purposes of this Article, NAGPRA provides tribes with significant 
regulatory oversight of cultural resources, human remains, and 
archaeological excavations on tribal lands. 
 
23.  See Janicki v. Hospital of St. Raphael, 744 A.2d 963, 967–69 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) 
(providing an excellent overview of property rights in human corpses from the time of Blackstone 
to the present). 
24.  Hugh Dellios & Rick Pearson, Neighbors Mourn Dickson Mounds’ Demise, CHICAGO 
TRIB. (Nov. 26, 1991), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1991-11-26/news/9104170045 
_1_native-americans-jim-edgar-archeologists (describing tension between Illinois residents and 
Native American groups over the treatment of native human remains on display at the Dickson 
Mounds burial site); see also N. BRUCE DUTHU, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 161–62 
(2008) (describing the theft of the skull and funerary objects of the great Native American leader 
Geronimo by Yale University’s notorious “secret” Skull & Bones Society). 
25.  25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316). 
26.  See Michael Kimmelman, Elgin Marble Argument in a New Light, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/24/arts/design/24abroad.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
(describing the ongoing disagreement between the United Kingdom and Greece over the 
ownership of the Elgin Marbles).  In many ways, the debate over the proper ownership of the 
Marbles resembles the debates between tribes and scientists over the proper place for tribal 
funerary relics and human remains. 
27.  25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316). 
28.  See Pueblo of San Ildefonso v. Ridlon, 103 F.3d 936, 939-40 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that NAGPRA applies to all artifacts, even those acquired before the enactment of the statute). 
29.  18 U.S.C. § 1170 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316); see United States v. Kramer, 
168 F.3d 1196, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding the criminal provisions of NAGPRA against 
an individual defendant). 
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NAGPRA’s definition of “tribal lands” is extremely broad and 
encompasses lands that would not normally be considered as “Indian 
country.”30  Accordingly, tribes have considerable control over cultural 
resources, even those discovered outside of “traditional” Indian country.  
NAGPRA’s provisions in this regard apply to both intentional 
archaeological excavations and the inadvertent discovery of cultural 
resources or human remains during other activities.31  In regard to those 
resources discovered on tribal lands, however, NAGPRA gives the 
landowning tribe essentially unbridled authority over those cultural 
resources.32  Although NAGPRA is far-reaching, the Act’s provisions are 
subject to several important limits, namely possession of resources for 
legitimate scientific study, delayed possession in the case of competing 
ownership claims, and takings claims.33 
However, NAGPRA’s efficacy is significantly influenced by the 
statute’s simultaneous operation and jurisdictional overlap with ARPA.  A 
slightly earlier statute, ARPA provides a scheme for federal oversight of 
archaeological excavations and the discovery of cultural resources on 
federal and public lands.34  Accordingly, the protection of tribal cultural 
resources is essentially split between NAGPRA and ARPA.35 
ARPA generally requires a permit for archaeological excavations on 
federal property.36  This requirement applies to tribal lands, though ARPA 
does define those lands more narrowly than NAGPRA does.37  The most 
significant interplay between NAGPRA and ARPA, however, is that 
obtaining a permit for an excavation on tribal lands requires the consent of 
the tribe or the tribal landowner, in addition to the Department of the 
Interior.38  Notably, tribes themselves are exempt from the permit 
requirements of ARPA on tribal lands and individual tribal members can 
also be exempt from the requirements of the Act.39  Thus, the intersection 
between NAGPRA and ARPA creates different requirements and rights for 
Indian tribes than other parties in regard to the excavation of cultural 
 
30.  25 U.S.C. § 3001(15) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316). 
31.  43 C.F.R. §§ 10.3(c), 10.5 (2017). 
32.  25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316). 
33.  Id. § 3005. 
34.  16 U.S.C. §§ 470(aa)-(mm) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316). 
35.  See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at 1230 (Nell Jessup 
Newton et al., eds., 2005). 
36.  16 U.S.C. § 470aa. 
37.  Id. § 470(bb)(4). 
38.  Id. § 470cc(g)(2); 43 C.F.R. § 7.8(a)(5) (2017). 
39.  16 U.S.C. § 470cc(g)(1); 25 C.F.R. § 262.4(c). 
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resources.  The issues that this scenario creates are explored in greater depth 
in the following section. 
III.   THE RISE OF TRIBAL CULTURAL HEGEMONY UNDER IACA 
AND NAGPRA/ARPA 
As previously described, both IACA and NAGPRA were enacted with 
the purpose of providing Native American tribes with greater autonomy and 
control over tribal cultural heritage, both past and present.  As this section 
will demonstrate, however, both the IACA and the NAGPRA—through 
their interplay with ARPA—have the unintended effect of concentrating 
power over tribal culture in the hands of more powerful, established native 
groups, much to the detriment of marginalized Indians who nonetheless are 
important voices in tribal culture.  Therefore, these statutes create tribal 
cultural hegemonies that can truly “prescribe what shall be orthodox” in 
terms of tribal culture.40  As a result, tribal groups and individuals that hold 
less political and economic power find themselves on the losing side of 
IACA and NAGPRA. 
A. IACA AND THE REMAKING OF INDIAN CULTURAL IDENTITY 
IACA turns on whether an item offered for sale is genuinely Indian-
made or not.  The statute defines “Indian” as “a member of an Indian tribe” 
or a person who “is certified as an Indian artisan by an Indian tribe.”41  
IACA includes state-recognized tribes within its ambit and in this regard, 
IACA’s definition of “Indian” is seen as the “most deferential used by 
Congress” in the whole of federal Indian law.42  The broad definition of 
“Indian” and the power given to tribes to determine who is an Indian for the 
purposes of the statue can be seen as a deliberate attempt by Congress to 
find a more inclusive definition of “Indian.”43 
Despite this, critics sharply contest whether IACA’s Indian definition 
gives tribal groups more power or simply further erodes it.44  In Indian 
country, the general reaction to IACA’s Indian definition has been harsh, 
with the act viewed as yet another paternalistic attempt by Congress to 
control Indian culture and decide who may and who may not participate in 
 
40.  West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
41.  25 U.S.C. § 305e(d)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316). 
42.  Margo S. Brownell, Who is an Indian? Searching for an Answer at the Core of Federal 
Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 275, 282 (2001). 
43.  Id. at 313-14. 
44.  Id. at 315. 
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it.45  Ultimately, among many tribes, IACA is seen as a failure, because, in 
many ways, the act punishes members of the very groups it was passed to 
protect.46 
Ultimately, the failure of IACA is due to the fact that for the purposes 
of determining who is an “Indian,” the Act’s definition simply resorts to the 
political measuring stick of official tribal enrollment.47  Thus, under IACA, 
Indians that are unenrolled in an official tribal group essentially stop being 
“Indian” under the statute.48  As a result, IACA disadvantages many 
otherwise genuine Indian artisans who may find themselves exposed to 
criminal or civil liability if they present their work as “Indian.”49  Although 
IACA allows tribes to certify non-member Indian artisans, certification is 
ultimately still dependent on a showing of documented Indian lineage.50 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that many American 
Indians refuse, for various reasons, to officially enroll as a member of a 
recognized—be it state or federal—tribe.51  Many Indian artisans also 
lament the aesthetic effect of IACA’s definition: the authenticity of Indian 
handicrafts under the statute is nominal only, because it is derived from a 
restricted definition rather than the expressive authenticity of the work 
itself.52  Thus, the “genuine Indian-made” label becomes a statement not 
about the products themselves, but the cultural identity of their producers.53  
Some Indian artisans view IACA and its definition of Indian as outright 
racism and have compared its policy to that of a fascist government.54  If 
African American artisans or Hispanic artisans do not need to certify their 
work as genuine, these individuals argue, why should Indian artisans be 
treated any differently?55  As a result, many otherwise genuine Indian 
artisans face increased economic disadvantages imposed by the very statute 
that was intended to protect their work and artistic identities.56 
 
45.  William J. Hapiuk, Jr., Of Kitsch and Kachinas: A Critical Analysis of the Indian Arts 
and Crafts Act of 1990, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1033-37 (2001) (providing several Indian 
opinions about the effect of IACA). 
46.  Woltz, supra note 6, at 448. 
47.  Id. at 450–51. 
48.  Haipuk, supra note 45, at 1012. 
49.  Woltz, supra note 6, at 447. 
50.  Haipuk, supra note 45, at 1026. 
51.  See Woltz, supra note 6, at 354 (describing some of the various reasons why many 
otherwise ethnically and culturally genuine Indians refuse to associate with a formal tribe). 
52.  Id. at 464. 
53.  Id. at 491. 
54.  See Haipuk, supra note 45, at 1036. 
55.  Id. 
56.  Woltz, supra note 6, at 447–48. 
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IACA has caused several high profile casualties.57  Shortly after the 
statute’s enactment, the Museum of the Five Civilized Tribes in Muskogee, 
Oklahoma was forced to close.58  The museum contained numerous works 
of art that were created by Indian artisans, yet the museum curators feared 
that many of the artists did not fall within IACA’s definition of “Indian.”59  
Rather than subject itself to possible criminal and civil liability, the 
museum closed.60 
Two of North America’s most prominent Indian artists, Jimmie 
Durham and Bert Seabourn, also found themselves on the wrong side of 
IACA’s Indian classification.61  Both artists had successful careers 
producing work that incorporated Indian themes, with some of Seabourn’s 
paintings being put on permanent display in the Vatican.62  However, under 
the terms of IACA, neither artist could present his work as “Indian” despite 
the fact that both artists are culturally and ancestrally Cherokee.63  Durham 
declined to seek admission as an enrolled member of the Cherokee tribe, 
whereas Seabourn had his requested certification as an Indian artisan denied 
by the Cherokee tribe.64  Likewise, some Indian artists, such Jeanne Walker 
Rorex, have refused to seek certification altogether, viewing IACA’s 
cultural certification of “authentic” Indian art as ideologically 
objectionable.65 
The statute has also adversely impacted entire tribes.  The most 
prominent example is an ongoing dispute between the Hopi and the 
Navajo.66  Recently, the Navajo have begun producing imitation Hopi 
Kachina dolls without adhering to traditional Hopi materials and 
workmanship.67  Although the imitation dolls are undoubtedly counterfeit 
and exactly the sort of imitation goods that IACA was enacted to prevent 
from flooding the marketplace, there is no recourse under the statute for the 
Hopi.68  Because the Navajo tribe is the group producing the dolls, the work 
is technically Indian-made under IACA’s definition, although the dolls 
themselves are not culturally Navajo.  The ongoing Hopi-Navajo feud is but 
 
57.  Haipuk, supra note 45, at 1011, 1034. 
58.  Id. at 1011. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. at 1034. 
62.  Id. 
63.  Haipuk, supra note 45, at 1034. 
64.  Id. 
65.  Id. at 1035. 
66.  Woltz, supra note 6, at 465. 
67.  Haipuk, supra note 45, at 1073–74. 
68.  Id. at 1074. 
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the first prominent example of what many Indians feared IACA would lead 
to: the emergence of an economically powerful tribe or class of Indians that 
would control the global market in Indian handicrafts without heed for the 
workmanship and traditions of less powerful groups.69 
B. POWER IMBALANCE AND CULTURAL AMBIGUITY UNDER NAGPRA 
AND ARPA 
Before Congress enacted NAGRPA, all Native American remains were 
considered federally owned property under the Antiquities Act of 1906.70  
Culminating with NAGRPA, under each subsequent archaeology law that 
Congress passed, Indian tribes were given greater and greater authority over 
cultural resources and human remains.71  This trend also roughly 
corresponds with the development of ethical codes and standards by the 
United States’ major professional archaeological associations, which have 
given more weight to cultural appreciation over time.72  As the field of 
archaeology became more culturally sensitive in its pursuits, NAGPRA 
sought to put Native American groups in a better bargaining position than 
they had been historically—and perhaps, in a better position than 
archaeologists.73  As a result, many commentators have criticized NAGPRA 
for permitting Native American groups to hinder further development of a 
historical understanding that would be of value to all humankind.74 
For example, one anthropologist has likened the repatriation of ancient 
human remains without first performing molecular and DNA scientific 
studies of the remains to a person burning a lost work of Shakespeare after 
reading it only once and then attempting to explain the work to the rest of 
the world.75  In other words, repatriation of ancient remains without study 
leaves anthropologists with only the most vague and impressionistic 
conclusions as to what the scientific importance of such remains may be.  
 
69.  Id. at 1056. 
70.  Lucus Ritchie, Indian Burial Sites Unearthed: The Misapplication of the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 71, 74 
(2005). 
71.  Michelle Hibbert, Galileos or Grave Robbers? Science, the Native American Graves 
Protection and Repatriation Act, and the First Amendment, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 425, 427 
(1999). 
72.  See Kelly E. Yasaitis, NAGPRA: A Look Back Through the Litigation, 25 J. LAND 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 259, 263–64 (2005) (providing an overview of the development of 
ethical codes among professional archaeologists). 
73.  See id. at 268. 
74.  Hibbert, supra note 71, at 435–36. 
75.  Robert W. Lannan, Anthropology and Restless Spirits: The Native American Graves 
Protection and Repatriation Act, and the Unresolved Issues of Prehistoric Human Remains, 22 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 392 (1998). 
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Conversely, many Native American groups view the scientific study of 
ancestral human remains as outright desecration and cultural destruction.76  
Such a view is hardly unwarranted: an estimated one hundred thousand to 
two million Native American graves across the United States have been 
excavated and the human remains and sacred funerary objects relocated to 
museums and research installations without tribal consent.77 
However, NAGPRA—and its interplay with ARPA—ultimately 
presents the same problem, albeit more removed, that IACA does, as who—
or whose remains—are “Indian” for the purposes of the Act can become 
incredibly arbitrary and disadvantage certain legitimate Indians.78  Under 
NAGPRA, those human remains found on tribal lands are supposed to be 
returned to their lineal descendants, though in practice finding those lineal 
descendants often proves to be an impossibility and the rightful owners 
cannot be established with any certainty.79  Furthermore, those 
archaeologists that wish to conduct legitimate excavations on tribal lands—
normally conducted under ARPA—must obtain tribal consent under 
NAGPRA.80  This alone creates enormous problems, as the policy 
objectives of ARPA and NAGPRA—to promote the scientific study of 
cultural resources and to protect cultural integrity, respectively—are often 
at odds with one another.81 
Much like IACA, under NAGPRA, varying notions of tribal culture 
and “Indianness” can allow more vocal, powerful tribal entities to assert 
cultural hegemony over smaller and less organized cultural groups.  To 
assert jurisdiction over human remains under NAGPRA, a current Indian 
tribe must show a “cultural affiliation” with the remains.82  The courts 
examine a wide array of factors in determining cultural affiliation, including 
geography, kinship, biological links, archaeological evidence, linguistics, 
folklore, oral traditions, and expert opinion.83  Of course, given the tragic 
 
76.  Gene A. Marsh, Walking the Spirit Trail: Repatriation and Protection of Native 
American Remains and Sacred Cultural Items, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 79, 92 (1992). 
77.  Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 39 (1992). 
78.  See S. Alan Ray, Native American Identity and the Challenge of Kennewick Man, 79 
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ultimately becomes whether someone’s bones are “Indian”). 
79.  Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra note 77, at 71; Lannan, supra note 75, at 398. 
80.  See Rebecca Tsosie, Privileging Claims to the Past: Ancient Human Remains and 
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81.  Id. at 609. 
82.  Id. at 601. 
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by the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Bonnichsen v. United States.  See 367 F.3d at 881–82 (rejecting 
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trajectory of American Indian history in the United States, a substantial 
number of Native American groups no longer reside on what were their 
aboriginal lands.84  As a result, those remains found on “tribal” lands can 
actually belong to now distantly located tribal groups, with the result being 
that the wrong tribes often end up asserting jurisdiction over remains with 
which they have no cultural ties.85  Furthermore, due to the lingering effects 
of federal termination and assimilationist policies, many otherwise 
legitimate Indian tribes cannot muster enough information to show the 
cultural links necessary to obtain custody of human remains under 
NAGPRA.86  This is complicated by the fact that cultural practices vary 
wildly throughout the North American Indian tribes, which can lead courts 
to impose inconsistent standards in NAGPRA disputes.87  Additionally, 
NAGPRA gives presumptive custody of human remains to the tribe on 
whose lands the remains were located, regardless of whether that tribe 
resided there historically.88  This quirk of NAGPRA is exacerbated by the 
fact that law further requires archaeologists that discover native remains to 
consult with the culturally affiliated tribe, rather than the tribes that were 
historically present in the same area.89  Thus, the implementation of 
NAGPRA has the potential for disputes over the control of cultural 
resources to develop between Indian tribes and archaeologists as well as 
between Indian tribes and other Indian tribes.  As one commentator has 
noted, NAGPRA has not particularly resolved any disputes over cultural 
resources, but rather reinvented the manner in which those disputes occur.90 
The basic interplay between NAGPRA and ARPA is as follows.  
NAGPRA does not come into effect until native human remains are 
located—either advertently or inadvertently—on federal or tribal lands.91  If 
for some reason NAGPRA does not apply, then the provisions of ARPA 
fully cover the cultural resources and archaeologists, with a permit from the 
 
tribes’ use of oral histories to establish a link between modern tribes and the remains of 
Kennewick Man).  For an extensive critique of the Bonnichsen decision, see Allison M. Dussias, 
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Department of the Interior, may study the resources and human remains.92  
However, as previously noted, this jurisdictional split between NAGPRA 
and ARPA—while certainly affording greater protection to Native 
American cultural resources—can actually inhibit repatriation and proper 
scientific studies that themselves could abet repatriation efforts. 
As critics of NAGPRA note, primacy is given to the current, rather 
than historical, occupancy of tribal lands in terms of determining cultural 
affiliation, though that presumption was slightly eroded in Bonnichsen v. 
United States.93  Though the Bonnichsen case, regarding the controversy 
over the ownership of the so-called “Kennewick Man,” has been written 
about ad nauseum, a brief explication of some of the issues in that case will 
serve to illustrate the problems that can arise under NAGPRA in its current 
form. 
In Bonnichsen, several Native American tribes battled a group of 
anthropologists for control of the remains of the Kennewick Man (or 
“Ancient One”), an 8300 to 9200 year old skeleton discovered along the 
banks of the Columbia River.94  The tribes sought custody of the remains to 
rebury them, whereas the anthropologists wanted the remains for study, 
given that a skeleton from Kennewick Man’s era of human history was an 
extremely rare discovery.95  Though the district and circuit courts examined 
a surfeit of historical and cultural evidence, the question in the case was 
ultimately the same question that arises under IACA and the broader sweep 
of federal Indian law: was Kennewick Man an Indian?  Ultimately, because 
the tribes could not muster enough evidence to establish that Kennewick 
Man was an Indian, the remains passed into the custody of the 
anthropologists under ARPA.96  Although the tribes were unable to 
repatriate Kennewick Man’s remains, many commentators lauded the 
decision, noting that since NAGPRA obviously does not apply to other 
ancient human remains in North America—Viking, Spanish, English, etc.—
it is perfectly logical that NAGPRA should not apply to Kennewick Man 
either.97  Ironically, subsequent DNA testing by anthropologists revealed 
 
92.  Id. at 283. 
93.  See Ray, supra note 78, at 90–91 (analyzing the state of NAGPRA jurisprudence after 
the Bonnichsen decision and observing that location of human remains is no longer enough 
evidence to establish cultural affiliation with a modern tribe). 
94.  367 F.3d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 2004). 
95.  Id. at 869. 
96.  Id. at 882. 
97.  Tsosie, supra note 80, at 599. 
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that Kennewick Man is indeed genetically related to modern Native 
Americans.98 
Thus, NAGPRA and ARPA can actually disrupt the very Indian culture 
that the statutes are supposed to protect.  First, the disruption of tribes’ 
historical geographies and the NAGPRA presumption of returning 
unidentified human remains to the current landowning tribe can actually 
prevent human remains from being repatriated to the proper ancestral tribe.  
Second, the great discretion of tribes to approve excavation and study 
permits under NAGPRA and ARPA can inhibit legitimate scientific and 
anthropological study that could perhaps further proper repatriation efforts. 
IV.   ESTABLISHING GREATER HORIZONTAL CONTROL OVER 
NATIVE CULTURE 
As previously discussed, the implementation of both IACA and 
NAGPRA inadvertently allow particular, and often random, Native 
American tribes to wield considerable control over other Indians, tribes, and 
segments of the academic community for the purposes of determining 
Indian identity and ownership of cultural resources.  Thus, tribes with less 
economic or political power can find themselves in the uncomfortable 
position of having other Indian groups resolving cultural questions for 
them.  The following sections suggest some solutions to this problem and 
offer safeguards to prevent more powerful Native American tribes from 
imposing “cultural hegemony” over less prominent groups. 
A. RESOLVING THE IACA INDIAN IDENTITY PROBLEM 
As previously mentioned, IACA, despite its unusually broad definition 
of “Indian,” leaves many genuine Indian artisans by the wayside and places 
sole authority over certification of non-member artisans in the hands of 
recognized tribes.99  Additionally, the ongoing Kachina doll feud, between 
the Hopi and the Navajo, exposes the risk of Indian tribes illegitimately 
manufacturing the handicrafts of other tribes.100  Although some of these 
issues could be resolved by retailoring the statute’s definition of “Indian,” 
some commentators have noted that it would be difficult to do so without 
 
98.  Carl Zimmer, New DNA Results Show Kennewick Man Was Native American, N.Y. 
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99.  25 U.S.C. § 305e(a)(3)(A)-(B) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-316). 
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412 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92: 397 
treading on the inherent sovereign power of tribes to define and enforce 
their own standards of tribal membership.101 
A mechanism that would allow for more inclusive certification of non-
tribal Indian artisans would be an IACA Certification Board.  Although this 
panel would be a government instrumentality, it would be pan-Indian and 
staffed entirely by members who are representative of the full breadth of 
North America’s state and federally recognized tribes, rather than Bureau of 
Indian Affairs functionaries or other bureaucrats.  Unenrolled Indian 
artisans could approach the comprehensive board for certification rather 
than a tribe in which the artisan would not necessarily be able—or want—to 
establish membership.  Furthermore, such a board could also serve as a 
forum for Indian crafts disputes that arise between tribes, such as the Hopi 
and Navajo.  Decisions of the board would be legally binding and thus 
allow tribes or individuals the ability to challenge them under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, thereby providing an avenue for otherwise 
unavailable relief. 
IACA Indian certification is essentially a trademark.102  However, 
simply relying on existing United States patent and trademark law to avoid 
the pitfalls of IACA would be to fundamentally disregard the distinct nature 
of the products that IACA protects.  The Indian handicrafts safeguarded 
under the statute are more than mere commodities.  Rather, they are living 
examples of Indian handicraft and artistic traditions.  An IACA 
Certification Board would still protect the cultural integrity of these 
traditions while simultaneously providing a rational solution to the 
problems under the statute. 
B. RESOLVING REPATRIATION DISPUTES UNDER NAGPRA 
As previously explored in greater, the repatriation provisions under 
NAGRPA do not always produce desirable results for all tribes and 
competing scientific entities.  The Bonnichsen decision demonstrates that 
the statute in its current form can produce absurd results, such as giving a 
finding by the Secretary of the Interior greater controlling weight than 
scientific data.103  However, on the whole, NAGPRA accomplishes what 
Congress intended the statute to do: to protect Native American burial sites 
and establish a process for current tribes to obtain custody of remains 
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discovered or held by museums.104  Regardless of its general efficacy, the 
statute could be tweaked slightly in order to better hone its purpose and 
corresponding results. 
First, NAGPRA and its implementing regulations should be revised to 
place a primary presumption on the geographically historic tribe—rather 
than the current landowning tribe—for repatriation purposes when human 
remains are discovered on tribal or federal lands.  As previously discussed, 
the history of Native Americans in the United States often makes it difficult 
to establish cultural affiliation between human remains and a current Indian 
tribe.105  The current NAGPRA regime requires archaeologists or 
government actors that discover human remains to consult with the 
landowning tribe rather than the historically present tribe.106  Because many 
current tribes no longer reside on their ancestral lands, the current 
NAGPRA presumption should be reversed to require consultation with 
historical tribes first, and then the current tribes second.  Thus, even if the 
culturally affiliated historical tribe cannot be located, the human remains 
will at least receive proper care at the hands of another Native American 
group rather than falling into the hands of a museum or researcher, and 
thereby, defeating NAGPRA’s purpose.  This alteration would ensure that 
tribes experiencing geographic and cultural disruption at the hands of the 
United States government would still be able to repatriate remains even 
though they may now only occupy small, distant tracts of non-ancestral 
land. 
Second, NAGPRA and its regulations should be implemented to allow 
for a balancing test between scientific study and cultural repatriation in 
exceptional cases, such as that of Kennewick Man.  Under the current 
regime, scientists may only study human remains under an ARPA permit 
when NAGPRA does not apply, essentially preventing researchers from 
conducting any work on the history of North America’s indigenous 
peoples.107  In fact, many archaeologists advocate for a change to the law 
where the scientific community would have equal bargaining power with 
Native American tribes in regard to the study of human remains.108  
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Furthermore, some commentators have argued for a “testing exception” to 
NAGPRA in those cases where it is clear that substantial scientific 
knowledge will be gained through study of the remains.109  Accordingly, 
NAGPRA, or its regulations, should be amended to allow for such a 
process.  In those exceptional and rare situations where it is clear than an 
archaeological discovery of human remains will yield significant scientific 
knowledge, a federal court could impose guidelines for a limited study 
under the oversight of the culturally affiliated tribe.  At the conclusion of 
the study, the remains would be returned to the culturally affiliated Native 
American group for ceremonial reburial.  Thus, should the future unearth 
another Kennewick Man, NAGPRA will be able to accommodate the 
interests of all parties. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted both IACA and NAGPRA to better protect Native 
American culture and give Indian tribes greater control over their own 
cultural output.  However, in some circumstances, both statutes have 
actually alienated legitimate members of the Indian community and allowed 
particular tribes to assert greater authority over pan-Indian culture.  Simple 
revisions of both IACA and NAGPRA would allow for greater cultural 
autonomy for Native American groups nationwide and encourage cultural 
exchange between Indians and non-native communities.  Although such 
revisions would ultimately benefit many Native Americans, the power to 
make such changes remains in Congress and the Department of the Interior.  
Doing so, however, would greatly benefit many Native American tribes and 
unaffiliated American Indians. 
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